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Symposium
The United States Constitution (rev. ed.)
How would you rewrite the United
States Constitution?
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL
COMMUNITY
Michael C. Dorf*
The history of constitutional change in the United States is
in substantial part a history of expanding the political community. Although the state property qualifications for voting
that were common at the Founding were abandoned without the
need for a federal constitutional amendment, such amendments
were used to widen the polity to include African Americans and
1
2
other non-white men, women, residents of the District of
3
4
5
Columbia, the poor, and young adults. Looking forward, one
might ask what other groups now denied political representation
could or should receive it in a more perfect Union.
Without denying the importance of other aspects of
constitutional design, one might think that the question of who
constitutes the polity is both more basic and more outcomedeterminative of the collective decisions a polity will reach than
are such still-important matters as whether to have a parliamentary, presidential, or mixed system of government, whether
to create a federal or unitary state, and whether and how to
provide for constitutional adjudication outside of the political
* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For helpful comments
and conversations, I thank Sherry Colb, Jill Hasday, and Steven Shiffrin.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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organs of government. To put the point somewhat provocatively,
the pre-Nineteenth Amendment male supremacists who argued
that extending the franchise to women would alter the whole
6
constitutional system were basically right.
Consider three groups whose interests the Constitution—
and the law more broadly—either ignores or grossly under7
counts: Non-citizens outside the United States; future
8
9
generations of citizens; and non-human animals. Political
decisions taken by the United States and its sub-units can and do
have very substantial effects on members of these groups; yet the
Constitution provides them with no effective mechanism to
protect their interests.
U.S. policy decisions profoundly affect non-citizens, future
generations, and non-humans without seriously consulting any of
them or otherwise considering their interests. For example, our
military and political leaders decide how much, if at all, to weigh
the value of non-citizen civilians sacrificed as “collateral
damage” to advance the perceived national security interests of
the United States, nominally bound by the international humanitarian law of war, but not answerable at the polls to the foreign
victims and their families. Likewise, politicians calculate the
long-term costs of borrowing money or despoiling the limited
resources of the natural environment, answerable only to the
voters of here and now, not to those who will one day inhabit the
6. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998–1003 (2002) (recounting antisuffrage arguments rooted in federalism purporting to show that even a constitutional
amendment could not grant women the vote).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990)
(holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable to search targeting Mexican citizen in Mexico
conducted by United States agents). I set to one side permanent residents and other noncitizens present in the United States because, while they lack a constitutional right to
vote, the Constitution does protect them in other respects. For simplicity, in the balance
of this Essay, I shall use the term “non-citizens” to mean “non-citizens outside the
United States.”
8. It is difficult to find a citation to support this point exactly, although Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) will probably serve. See id. at 157 (“[I]n nearly all . . .
instances, the use of the word [‘person’] is such that it has application only postnatally.
None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application.”). From
the fact that fetuses lack constitutional personhood, it would appear to follow a fortiori
that as-yet unconceived generations lack constitutional personhood.
9. See, e.g., Int’l Primate Protection League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc.,
799 F.2d 934, 937–39 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding no standing for animal welfare activists to
sue to enforce federal law governing treatment of animals used for research without
pausing to consider the injuries to the monkeys themselves). As a general matter,
American law treats non-human animals as property, with the consequence that it denies
recognition to their rights and, except for very limited and largely ineffective protections,
their interests. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995).
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world that results. And human citizens decide whether it is
acceptable to confine, exploit, inflict suffering upon, and kill
non-human animals to satisfy human preferences for food,
clothing, and other products.
Suppose one thought that a just legal order would include
mechanisms for giving substantial weight to the interests of noncitizens, future generations, and/or non-human animals. What
mechanisms could be designed to give them that weight?
Direct political representation is ordinarily a useful starting
point in answering such questions, but for future generations and
non-humans, it is a non-starter. Even those non-human species
(such as great apes and parrots) that can be taught to communicate in human language would not be capable of exercising
the franchise intelligently.
Giving voting rights to non-citizens is a theoretical
possibility, but it faces practical obstacles and principled
objections. A country that has recurring difficulty counting the
votes of citizens of Florida would be utterly flummoxed at the
prospect of counting votes worldwide, including votes of persons
living under nondemocratic regimes unaccustomed and hostile
to holding free and fair elections for domestic purposes, much
less foreign ones. Moreover, even if the practical obstacles could
be overcome, it is not at all obvious that the interests of noncitizens should count equally with those of citizens, or even with
one another. Would Mexicans and Canadians receive half-votes,
with persons living farther away receiving quarter-votes? For
roughly the same reason that the Supreme Court adopted the
10
11
one-person-one-vote rule in Reynold v. Sims and its progeny,
any other voting formula would be arbitrary; yet one-personone-vote would over-value the interests of non-citizens—unless
for an election to some sort of world government.
World government—not in the literal sense but in the more
limited sense of participation in international institutions—is a
more promising avenue for ensuring that attention would be
paid to the interests of non-citizens. Here, a change to the
constitutional text would be useful. As famously stated in the
12
Paquete Habana, “International law is part of our law.” True
enough, but international law is a subordinate part of our law,
valid only to the extent it is not superseded by a later-in-time
10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. See, e.g., Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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statute or the Constitution. Suppose the following amendment,
which would effectively modify the Supremacy Clause itself: “No
law in conflict with international law shall be valid.” Thus
amending the Constitution to require that U.S. law conform with
international law—rather than vice-versa—would go at least
some way towards ensuring that U.S. law takes account of the
interests of non-citizens.
Yet under the Westphalian system under which we still live,
international law itself is largely a creation of sovereigns,
including, especially, powerful sovereigns like the United States.
One might worry that in a world in which the United States were
more strongly bound by international law, the United States
would withdraw from treaties and otherwise use its power to
water down the content of international law. Still, the United
States is not all-powerful. If coupled with domestic and international enforcement mechanisms, inverting the relationship
between U.S. and international law would appear to be a
promising mechanism for taking account of the interests of noncitizens.
To be sure, the people who now complain that our courts
should not even look to international or foreign sources for
13
interpretive guidance in construing American constitutional law
would undoubtedly oppose an effort to make international law
superior to domestic law. And even those of us who think the
objections lack force when directed against the current, quite
limited use of foreign and international law, might concede that
they make more sense as a critique of my thought-experiment.
Giving international law real bite would in fact reduce the
responsiveness of American law to American voters, making our
system less “democratic” in some sense. But that is an inevitable
consequence of giving greater voice to the interests of nonAmericans. Representation is more or less a zero-sum game, and
to a significant extent, so is virtual representation.
What about future generations? Near-term future
generations benefit from some virtual representation. People
care about their children and grandchildren in ways that affect
both private decisions—such as providing for the health,
education, and welfare of their offspring—and in their public
policy decisions—such as in providing funding for education,
environmental protection, and other programs that provide longterm benefits. But such concerns have limited time horizons;
13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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environmental damage done today may have consequences ten
or more generations from now, affecting people only faintly
related to anyone now living (either as a matter of genetics or
emotions). And even with respect to the near-term future,
revealed preferences show only limited concern for leaving, in
14
Locke’s terms, as much and as good for others.
It is not difficult to propose policies that would provide
greater protection for future generations: less borrowing for
consumption rather than investment on the economic side; less
and more efficient use of the Earth’s resources on the
environmental side. But the devil is both in the details and in
human shortsightedness. Constitutional rules designed to
promote fiscal responsibility, of the sort one finds in state
constitutions, can lead to perverse outcomes, such as one-time
sales of public resources or pension fund raids. And the
classification of some spending as “investment” rather than
“consumption,” while not infinitely manipulable, can be the sort
of judgment call that will lead politicians to game any limits.
Meanwhile, on the environmental side, Pigovian taxes on fossil
fuels and consumption more broadly would be extraordinarily
helpful, but likewise have been quite unpopular in the United
States. The very factors that lead the United States to have the
lowest gasoline taxes in the developed world would almost
certainly frustrate any effort to write similar policies into the
Constitution. Concerns about future generations thus seem
likely to remain more a matter of political rhetoric than
constitutional reality.
I am likewise dubious about the power of constitutional
change as a mechanism for protecting non-human animals.
Indeed, as I shall explain momentarily, in the medium term I am
dubious about the ability of any strategy for substantially
improving the lives of non-human animals through law.
In recent years, states have adopted animal welfare laws
that regulate such matters as the size of the cages in which
chickens, calves, and pigs can be confined, but so long as people
insist on confining, exploiting, and killing billions of non-human
animals for food and other purposes, it is difficult to imagine any
14. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT § 33 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). Locke was
discussing the origins of property appropriated by individuals as against others of their
generation, but the point clearly holds inter-generationally as well. See, e.g., id. (“No
body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good
draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst.”).
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protection for those animals against those very appropriations of
their lives. Indeed, it can be argued that current welfare laws
actually entrench the practice of animal exploitation. Such laws
provide consumers with (mostly false) assurances that the animal
products they consume were produced without inflicting
suffering on animals, thus stabilizing or perhaps even increasing
demand for these products. So long as our politics only allow
such feeble laws, it is not clear that people who care about the
wellbeing of non-human animals should seek their enactment.
Changes in behavior must precede receptivity to legal changes
that would actually make a difference—such as a constitutional
right of sentient creatures not to be eaten or otherwise treated as
things. I would favor such a right, but I do not expect to see it in
my lifetime.
So much for the possibilities of further expanding the polity
in ways that parallel the changes wrought by the Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth
Amendments. Now consider whether we might want to shrink
the polity. Here I shall briefly consider how the Constitution
provides considerable protection for, or at least reflects the
wishes of, two groups whose interests would appear to be much
less substantial than those just noted—namely, corporations and
dead people.
15
It remains to be seen whether Citizens United v. FEC
substantially changes campaign finance or politics more broadly
16
in the United States, in the way that its critics fear. In my view,
large corporations, unions, other associations, and wealthy
individuals already had ample opportunities to influence politics
before Citizens United, and so the decision’s net impact will
17
likely be minor. But one impact of Citizens United is already
certain: The case has galvanized a political movement to amend
the Constitution to strip corporations of at least some First
18
Amendment protection.

15. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 63; Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Jan. 28, 2010, at 39 .
17. See Michael C. Dorf, The Marginality of Citizens United, CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 739 (2011).
18. See Letter from Jeffrey D. Clements et al. to Hon. Patrick Leahy et al. (Oct. 4,
2010), available at http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/finalfsfppfaw.pdf. The
letter of attorneys and law professors urges Congress to “explore all potential remedies,
including proposals for a 28th Amendment,” but does not specify the content of such an
Amendment.
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Such an amendment could be worded as follows: “This
Constitution shall not be construed to afford free speech rights
to anyone other than natural persons and artificial entities
formed for the specific purpose of communication.” I would
include some artificial entities in an amendment restricting
corporate speech because such entities may be essential to
facilitating the speech of natural persons. Of course, an
amendment of this sort would require private actors, judges, and
other government officials to draw some difficult lines about
what counts as a protected artificial entity, but such line-drawing
is inherent in the law, and does not strike me as qualitatively
more difficult in this area than in any other. A bolder effort to
de-personify artificial entities (which I do not favor) might strip
such entities of all constitutional protection.
Dead people present other issues. The dead may have direct
constitutional rights. Thus, although no Supreme Court case
directly addresses the issue, it is possible to imagine recognition
for a limited property or “privacy” right in a dead body. Other
sub-constitutional laws and doctrines—such as the common law
19
of attorney-client privilege and the state law of wills—grant
substantial recognition to the interests of the dead. But these
protections do not strike me as excessive.
However, the political preferences of the dead have a very
large impact on our law and politics. Because we are so
accustomed to thinking of the “dead hand” problem as a
metaphor, it is easy to forget that it is more than that. The
continuation on the books of laws passed decades or centuries
ago means that we are, in an important sense, ruled by decisions
taken by people who are long dead. For statutes and other subconstitutional law, the ability of contemporary majoritarian
processes to repeal or modify old laws reduces the influence of
the dead. Because of the difficulty of overcoming legislative
inertia and the baroque structure of the federal lawmaking
process under Article I, § 7, the dead retain substantial influence
over sub-constitutional law. But we might think that such
influence is justified, or at least tolerable, on Burkean or other
grounds that favor the claims of stability over the claims of
contemporary values. Yet the very high bar for constitutional
amendment—impossibly high in the case of the fundamental
matter of representation in the Senate—makes Burkean and like

19. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
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justifications untenable as a defense of the dead’s continuing
influence.
I can make the point most clearly with a thought
experiment. Suppose that the Constitution was not adopted in
1789 but in Roman times, or suppose that despite repeated
efforts to abolish the Senate, the equal-suffrage clause prevented
such a change, leaving the Constitution in place in the year 4000.
Unless one independently thought that the equal-suffrage clause
was a worthwhile principle of political justice that trumps
contemporary consensus, could its adoption thousands of years
earlier by a very different society possibly justify its retention?
Absent revolution or resort to amendment outside of
20
Article V, the near-impossibility of amending the Senate and
the difficulty of amendment more generally mean that any
proposal to make the Constitution easier to amend is unrealistic
as a practical proposal. A constitutional requirement that laws
sunset would address the problem of statutory rule by the dead,
but that problem seems to me not nearly so acute as the
difficulty of amending the Constitution itself.
Thus, the dead-hand problem reduces to the following core
question of constitutional design: How difficult (and difficult in
exactly what way) should it be to amend a constitution? Rather
than trying to specify an ideal amendment procedure, I will
simply conclude by noting that this kind of structural question is,
in an important sense, also a question about who comprises the
polity. No less than the amendments expanding the franchise,
Article V reflects at least a tacit judgment about who We the
People are. That is quite possibly a bad judgment, but it is a
judgment nonetheless.

20. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000); Akhil
Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).

